How R2P failed Syria by Nasser-Eddine, Minerva
How R2P failed Syria – Minerva Nasser-Eddine 
16 
How R2P failed Syria  
Dr Minerva Nasser-Eddine 
 
Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, called for 
2012 to be the ‘year of prevention’. He went on to note: 
‘Prevention does not mean looking the other way in times of crisis, 
vainly hoping that things will get better...’1 These comments 
supported a newly adopted international norm - Responsibility to 
Protect, otherwise known as R2P. It’s a new approach to addressing 
conflict allegedly applied with success in Libya in 2011.  
2012 has proved to be anything but the ‘year of prevention’ for 
Syrians, however. At the time of writing the Syrian conflict 
continues to escalate well beyond the peaceful protests which 
began over 18 months ago; at a time when ‘prevention’ of the 
conflict would have been easier to manage. By now over 30 000 
Syrians have been killed, over a million have sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries (300 000 of them registered in refugee 
camps), and over 3 million are internally displaced. Meanwhile 
systematic acts of brutality, including torture and arbitrary arrests 
by the Syrian military and civilian leadership, continue. The once 
peaceful tactics of the Syrian protestors have become equally 
violent. Frustration on the international diplomatic front continues 
to grow.  
The failure to make headway in Syria is complex. Security and 
national interests are at stake for domestic, regional and foreign 
powers. Real-politik and power politics between emerging and 
established powers is the key. National interests are being pursued 
at the cost of ideological principles, international law and 
conventions, regional stability and peace. As they were nearly 100 
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years ago, the great powers (US, Russia and China) are facing off 
in a contest for a new Middle East. Meanwhile they are happy for 
their proxies Iran and Syria on one side, and Turkey, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia on the other hand, to risk protracted conflict with 
each other. These nations are competing for access to the region’s 
resources. Their national interests will manifest in many ways, 
including the shifting of alliances. For these reasons the application 
of R2P will fail where security and national interests of powers are 
at stake. 
 
What is R2P? 
R2P emerged from a human security framework which places the 
protection of human rights at the centre of international peace and 
security norms and practices. It is meant to be used as a 
preventative tool. The onus is placed on the international 
community to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect 
their citizens. If a state fails, or is failing, then the responsibility 
falls on the international community.  Since R2P was agreed to by 
the international community at the 2005 World Summit, the UN 
and its member states have sought to identify the precipitating 
factors that lead to violence, conflict and atrocities, and develop 
tools to address them – ideally before the situation reaches crisis 
point. As noted by Ban: ‘Prevention means proactive, decisive and 
early action to stop violence before it begins’.2 
R2P seeks to track the international response to imminent and 
developing crises within countries. The preventative tool delves 
into the actions of key regional actors/organisations, the UN and 
the ICC. The R2P tool has three active pillars. R2P stipulates that: 
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Pillar 1: Every state has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from the four mass atrocity crimes.  
 
Pillar 2: The wider international community has the responsibility 
to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that 
responsibility. 
 
Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, 
the international community must be prepared to take appropriate 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in 
accordance with the UN Charter. 
 
There is general consensus that Pillar 3 allows legitimate coercive 
measures to be adopted, as a last resort, to protect people from four 
mass atrocity crimes (conflict, genocide, war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing). These pillars are meant to be flexible in their 
application. 
R2P: failure or success? The Libyan case 
Proponents of R2P have listed a number of success stories where 
R2P has been invoked to varying degrees thus far: Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Libya, South Sudan, Yemen 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
Libya has often been touted as a successful case of the application 
of R2P. A number of non-military measures were adopted to 
protect Libyans and to stabilise the country in 2011. Diplomatic 
intervention, punitive sanctions and a no-fly zone were imposed on 
the Libyan regime. Yet when these measures failed to resolve the 
Libyan crisis, it led to broader interpretation and application of 
Pillar 3. 
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In the Libya case, Australia adopted a pro-intervention policy along 
with many other proponents of R2P. In fact Australia has always 
had a role in the creation and application of R2P. Former Foreign 
Minister, Gareth Evans helped formulate this concept, and Foreign 
Ministers Rudd and Carr have since endorsed, adopted and applied 
R2P when it suited Australia. 
The Libyan case is a ‘work in progress’ when it comes to applying 
R2P. Supporters acknowledge that R2P had teething problems that 
need to be improved in application, or in ‘operationalizing the 
concept’.3 
There has been criticism of R2P since it was first conceived in the 
late 1990s, especially in recent times due to the experiences of Cote 
d’Iviore and Libya. Reflecting on the Libyan experience, Ban notes 
‘some innocent lives were lost in the name of R2P. That is why the 
use of force is never our first choice. Many more lives were saved, 
however.’ But the criticism, especially in the Libyan case, wasn’t 
just focused on the loss of lives. Rather it was deemed problematic 
on a number of fronts: first, the way the UN mandate was 
interpreted by NATO forces; and secondly, how the application of 
Pillar 3 had an impact on state sovereignty. State sovereignty has 
long been the cornerstone of the international system. R2P 
challenges this by suggesting an ethical value, protection of human 
rights, which transcends State borders and the right to territorial 
control. Sovereignty is now ‘evolving into a concept based on a 
state’s responsibilities to its citizens and the international 
community’.4 This new basis for humanitarian intervention has 
been viewed by some as eroding the existing normative basis of the 
international political system, thus allowing major powers to 
intervene selectively in the domestic affairs of weaker states.5 
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In the case of Libya, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 1973 drew on previous agreements and it takes them a 
step further. The standard language of previous UNSC resolutions 
often uses to ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence’.6 In contrast, Resolution 1973 uses the phrase ‘Member 
State (...) to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack’, dropping the word 
‘imminent’ and including a more expansive concept of ‘civilian 
populated areas’. This concept therefore provided a reason to 
defend ‘civilian populated areas’ that were not necessarily in 
immediate danger. No explanation of ‘all necessary means’ was 
provided. The resolution has been interpreted both narrowly and 
broadly. Thus state sovereignty is called into question – when is it 
acceptable to infringe upon another country’s territory in the name 
of human rights protection? A third of the Security Council 
abstained from Resolution 1973, highlighting the controversial 
nature of the wording and its potential application, although many 
of these same countries did not have a problem with earlier 
Resolution 1970 which imposed sanctions and referred the Qaddafi 
regime to the ICC. Germany and the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China) abstained. The reasons cited for abstaining were 
based on interpretation of the Resolution, actual political intent of 
the remaining three permanent members, and the low chance of 
success of the mission.  
The two permanent members (China and Russia) chose not to 
invoke their veto rights. They cited the Arab League’s support of 
the no-fly zone as the key to their decision to abstain rather than 
veto. Thus overall one can argue that although these abstaining 
nations were concerned about the wording and potential 
implications of the Resolution they accepted the importance of 
protecting civilians in other countries but questioned the manner of 
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implementing R2P, as opposed to the appropriateness of the norm 
itself.7 Advocates of R2P praised the international community for 
embracing this new international norm and were positive that a new 
era of international diplomacy had commenced.  
 
Soon after the passing of Resolution 1973, events suggested that 
the initial optimism was misplaced: ‘Indeed, NATO’s activities 
over Libya in pursuit of UN Resolution 1973 have again raised 
questions over the timeliness, legitimacy, proportionality and 
effectiveness of military action...There is a need to analyse the 
consistency, legitimacy and effectiveness of pillar three tools such 
as economic sanctions, diplomacy and civilian and military 
responses, especially in terms of how they impact on and 
complement preventive and re-building strategies’.8 Concerns have 
also arisen as to how military action sits alongside other Pillar 
Three tools such as preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions, and 
civilian protection missions. Not surprisingly, the issue of 
sovereignty arose again. The boundary between Pillar One (state 
responsibility) and Pillars Two and Three is a key issue when it 
comes to the issue of international responsibility ‘requiring’ 
infringement of state sovereignty. Many critics argued that NATO 
overstepped its mandate by launching a military campaign with the 
ultimate desire for regime change. The Libyan opposition took 
advantage of NATO air force support to halt Moammar Gaddafi’s 
retreating convoy - which led to his capture and killing.  This 
became a point of division for many nations, especially those who 
abstained from the earlier vote. In turn this has contributed to 
responses to the Syrian crisis.  
 
After the Libyan intervention, India’s Ambassador to the UN 
Hardeep Singh Puri began referring to NATO as the ‘armed wing’ 
of the Security Council. There was disquiet about NATO’s actions 
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in Libya and how UNSC Resolution1973 was used to justify their 
actions. Some concerns were based on: the rejection of ceasefire 
offers which may have resulted in non-military compliance; 
indiscriminate attacks by NATO; targeting fleeing troops that 
posed no immediate threat to civilians; targeting of civilian 
locations; and openly supporting the opposition. The line was 
blurred between the objective of protecting Libyan civilians living 
in Benghazi and the objective of overthrowing the regime. Thus the 
issue of when, if ever, it is legitimate for the international 
community to enforce regime change has now come to the 
forefront of international relations. 
 
It is as a result of the Libyan experience that Brazil introduced a 
variation on R2P: RwP – Responsibility while Protecting. RwP 
‘seeks to address concerns regarding the implementation of military 
measures to prevent and halt mass atrocities... it must be regularly 
monitored and periodically assessed so as to minimise the impact 
on civilians.’9 RwP is meant as a clarifying principle, or 
supplement, to R2P rather than a new concept rivalling R2P. It 
maintains support for intervention and the Third Pillar while 
allowing timely and decisive action. Although yet to be 
implemented, the additional clarity promised by RwP does not 
provide answers to how R2P interventions should be conducted.  
As a consequence of NATO actions (led by France, the UK and the 
US) the Libyan case has been cited as a reason for not applying 
R2P in the case of Syria. Supporters of R2P on the other hand 
argue that it needed to be applied long ago and it is the politicking 
of big powers which is delaying its application. So far, and at the 
time of writing, the anti-R2P argument regarding intervention in 
Syria is clearly prevailing. 
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Why R2P has failed Syria today 
Although R2P is morally laudable, in reality it’s not a tool which 
can be applied in a world that is heavily vested in politics. Whilst 
the world continues to be divided among big and small powers, and 
the division between the Global North and South widens, the 
principle of state sovereignty will continue to be highly valued by 
smaller, weaker, or threatened powers (which will more often be 
the countries subject to R2P interventions), as opposed to their 
stronger, wealthier and larger counterparts. 
As the world has witnessed the downward spiral of Syria and the 
gradual spreading of the conflict, notable comments have been 
made by diplomats on how ‘difficult’ and ‘different’ the Syrian 
case is, despite in principle support of R2P. For instance, 
Australia’s Foreign Minister, Bob Carr noted: ‘This is a militarily 
strong regime. There isn't an appetite, and not a budget, in the 
Western world for the sort of intervention that would be involved 
here’.10 Co-creator of R2P Gareth Evans said Syria has:  ‘... a very 
different geopolitical environment ... no Arab League unanimity in 
favour of tough action; a long Russian commitment to the Assad 
regime; and strong Syrian armed forces with a credible air-defence 
system, meaning that any intervention would be difficult and 
bloody ... It’s too late now for such renewed consensus to help 
much now in Syria.11 Professor of Law, Errol Mendes, pointed out 
that ‘Syria is a very hard case for current R2P intervention, due to 
the tri-level proxy war unfolding there’.12       
Syria has presented a security dilemma for its immediate 
neighbours. Whilst the Assad regime fights for its survival (with 
the assistance of Russia, Iran and China) it is threatening the 
security of others (Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel). What we 
are also witnessing is the adaptation to these changing 
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circumstances by different actors (state and non-state). They are 
responding to who rules in Syria, and how this impacts on their 
immediate security and (national) interests. The multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious makeup of Syria lends itself to cross-border 
interaction, its geostrategic position attracts big power interests, 
and the potential political vacuum that will arise post-Assad attracts 
the ambitions of regional powers. Therefore, there is a real threat of 
the conflict spreading beyond Syria’s borders (as we have seen 
already with growing tensions within Lebanon and Turkey). 
It is not just the Syrian population who face the devastation of a 
dragged out civil war, but the region itself will remain in a state of 
heightened threat, tension and uncertainty until the scrambling to 
fill the post-Assad political vacuum reaches an end point. These 
unsettled conditions, with rampant violence and arms transfer, raise 
a considerable risk of non-state actors using terrorism to advance 
their political objectives. The Assad regime may command 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah, a powerful Shiite group and close ally of 
Syria and Iran, to distract attention from Syria by provoking 
conflict with Israel (as recent drone attacks demonstrated) or the 
anti-Syrian “March 14” movement in Lebanon. The recent 
assassination of Wissam al-Hassan, an anti-Assad Lebanese 
(Sunni) intelligence officer, may be a demonstration of such a 
tactic.  On the other hand, Al-Qaeda operatives and other Islamic 
insurgent actors are increasing their involvement in countries such 
as Syria. Radicalised political Islamists also know that if countries 
in the Arab world turn to democracy, it delegitimises their 
theocratic political ideology. 
It is true that there are many differences between Syria and 
Qaddafi’s Libya. Syria’s complex ethnic, tribal and geographic 
makeup is very different to that of Libya. Libya is 93% Sunni 
Muslim while Syria has a majority Sunni population of 68% and 
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the remainder are of diverse Muslim and non-Muslim sects. Syria’s 
geographic position is also of immense strategic significance, 
situated amidst oil-rich nations and at the crossroads of the West 
(Israel), Sunni interests (Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) and Shia 
interests (Iran, South Lebanon). Unlike Libya, Syria is militarily 
stronger, especially in ground-to-air and air defences. The Syrian 
army is five times larger than the former Libyan army under 
Qaddafi. Syria has the support of Russia, China, Iran and some 
Iraqi government officials while Libya was much more 
diplomatically isolated. Unlike Libya’s Qaddafi who was for many 
years pictured as a madman, Assad seemed rational and (Western) 
educated. Unlike Libya, Syria has always had a key role in the 65 
year old Arab-Israeli conflict; Israel continues to occupy the Syrian 
Golan Height. The underpinnings of the Libyan uprising were 
regional and tribal in nature; the Syrian uprising on the other hand 
began with calls for real democratic and civil rights reform. It was 
only later that the Syrian civil war developed into a sectarian 
conflict with a degree of surreptitious involvement of arms 
suppliers and fighters from outside the country. In Libya, Qaddafi 
lost the eastern half of his country within days of the start of the 
uprising. Syria on the other hand is experiencing fighting 
throughout the country in major population centres. Syria’s 
population (21 million) is almost four times greater than that of 
Libya (6.5 million), and largely based in high density urban centres.  
The international community has been much more divided in the 
Syrian case. The EU, US, and most fellow Arab countries have 
called on Assad to step down. China, Russia, Iran and some Latin 
American countries continue to see this as interference. 
Neighbouring countries are actively arming the two sides – the 
Russians and Iranians have provided the Syrian regime with arms 
and military expertise. The Gulf States are funnelling weapons to 
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the Sunni insurgents via Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. The 
CIA are providing weapons and training to the Syrian opposition. 
The US wants to protect its own security and national interest. By 
extension this means enforcing the position of their long standing 
allies in the region – Israel and Saudi Arabia. Russia is trying to 
retain and rebuild its existing alliances in the region. Support of the 
Assad regimes goes back to the 1950s, and Russia still maintains a 
naval base in Tartar. Importantly, it has commercial interests in 
Syria, having invested almost $20 billion in Syria’s infrastructure, 
energy and tourism sectors in 2009 alone. Currently Russia has 
approximately $5 billion in arms contracts with Syria. Having lost 
billions of dollars due to the sanctions on Iran and Libya its defence 
industry needs these contracts to be delivered.  
An additional layer to this conflict is the war being fought over 
Iran. The US and its allies feel threatened by the resurgence of Iran 
on two fronts: Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the spread of Iranian 
sponsored Shi’ism in the Muslim world. Russia has helped Iran 
build its nuclear program and China needs Iranian oil, so both are 
willing to support Iran’s policies to secure their own interests. The 
US wants to ensure its own interests in the region including the 
need to assist its Sunni allies (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Turkey etc.) 
from the spread of Shi’ism and Iranian influence.  
The real-politik of US foreign policy is illustrated in the double 
standards adopted by US support for the Arab uprisings in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya and Syria but not in Bahrain; the latter is ruled by a 
Sunni minority monarch over a Shiite majority population. Thus in 
light of the demise of Sunni governed Iraq (which once held the 
position of being the bulwark against the spread of Shi’ism in the 
region) renewed security competition between the Sunni Arab 
rulers and Shia Persians (Iran) deepens. Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
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also ensure a sense of deep insecurity to its neighbours, particularly 
Israel, which has been beating the war drums on this front.   
Western intervention in the Syrian conflict is also linked to Israel’s 
agenda to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.  With Iran’s refusal to 
comply with UN resolutions to open up its nuclear facilities and 
intentions it has been subject to harsh UN imposed sanctions. The 
US administration has refused to approve Israeli airstrikes on Iran 
in the lead-up to a US Presidential election, against the background 
of war fatigue, a mammoth budget deficit and significant risks to 
oil supplies in the event of retaliation by Iran. Whether the post-
election US approves an Israeli strike on Iran will also have a huge 
impact on the war in Syria. A weakened Iranian regime could spell 
the imminent demise of the Syrian regime; but an enraged Iran 
could seek to use the Syrian conflict as another front on which to 
attack pro-Western targets in Israel, Lebanon and Turkey. The 
warning issued by Lakhdar Ibrahimi, the UN peace envoy to Syria 
in October - "you cannot expect the Syrian crisis to remain within 
Syrian borders" - equally applies to a strike on Iran. 
UN Special Envoys Kofi Annan and his successor Ibrahimi have 
worked hard to resolve the Syrian conflict. So far they have had 
little success. Other than the UN Special Envoys, regional 
organisations (EU, Arab League, GCC), other arms of the UN 
(Special advisers on the Prevention of Genocide to R2P, Human 
Rights Council, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Under-
Secretary on Humanitarian Affairs) and governments have also put 
forward peace proposals and diplomatic remedies to the current 
conflict. Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi created a diplomatic 
group composed of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. He 
opposes intervention but whether he can constrain Turkey and 
Saudi from directly intervening is yet to be seen. Like Annan and 
Ibrahimi, Morsi also insists that a resolution to this conflict cannot 
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be resolved without the inclusion of Iran. The IBSA (India, Brazil, 
South Africa) political bloc of emerging powers sent a high level 
delegation to Damascus to plead with the President to stop the 
killing, and in October 2011 IBSA abstained from the Security 
Council (SC) Resolution seeking to curtail civilian massacre by the 
Syrian Government. Other proposals have ranged from establishing 
no-fly zones, buffer zones, “no-kill zones,” safe-havens, protected 
humanitarian corridors, arming the Free Syrian Army to fight 
Assad’s regime, to outright invasion to overthrow the Assad 
regime. Thus despite various United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) and UNSC Resolutions condemning the violence in Syria, 
divisions among SC members (ie disparate national interests) 
remain a barrier to the implementation R2P in Syria. 
Concluding Thoughts 
R2P faces the same problems as previous humanitarian intervention 
tools – the lack of resources and political will. R2P advocates have 
suggested that one way of overcoming this is to co-op the 
involvement and assistance of regional organisations. Although 
regional organisations may be better placed to intervene in a timely 
manner there is nothing to suggest – historically or otherwise – that 
the same problems that arise within the UN system will not reoccur 
at the regional level. This has recently been demonstrated in the 
Arab League’s role in the cases of Libya and Syria, where in the 
latter case they have been divided. Neither the United Nations nor 
regional fora have been united enough or empowered to overcome 
the self-interest of separate nations. Thus there has never been 
consistency in the application of humanitarian interventions, 
especially those requiring the backing of force. 
Who decides when and where to intervene, especially if it is 
outside a UN Mandate? Fiot et al articulately noted the following 
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problem faced by R2P proponents: ‘The danger is that those states 
deciding on when and where to intervene are not those in danger of 
being intervened in ... Without a world body viewed as legitimate 
by all members of the international system there is little hope of a 
successful implementation of the concept’.13 The Syrian case 
shows R2P is purely a ‘theoretical construct’ which has ‘little 
practical utility’,14 especially when there will be winners and losers 
in terms of national self-interest when regime change occurs. 
Meanwhile hardship will persist for ordinary Syrians. 
Unfortunately, Ban’s warning has gone unheard:  ‘Yet let us also 
remember: historically, our chief failing as an international 
community has been the reluctance to act in the face of serious 
threats. The result, too often, has been a loss of lives and credibility 
that haunt us ever after.’ Sadly, the Syrian case will further damage 
the credibility of the UN and those who yearn for it to play an 
effective role in the protection of human rights. 
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